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A COMPARISON OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN 
Party identification is a well established concept in 
American political science. People may disagree over whether it is 
best interpreted in a psychological or information theoretic framework, 
but the notion that voters form standing commitments to their parties 
is widely accepted in the U.S • •  Bearing in mind evidence that party 
identification and short term forces are not as neatly separable as 
was once thought, there is still little doubt that party identification. 
and vote variables measure different phenomena. 
The status of party identification in Great Britain is more 
dubious. It seems to be harder to distinguish party identification 
from vote intention. The conventional wisdom since the publication 
of Butler and Stokes' Political Change in Britain has been that when 
voters indicate that they generally think of themselves as Conservative 
or Labour, they are merely reporting their current vote intention. 
British voters allegedly are less able to distinguish their general 
partisan inclinations from their decision to support a particular 
party at a particular point in time. As Butler and Stokes themselves 
concluded, "The difference between the two countries seems therefore 
to mainly reside in the extent to which there is an explicit and 
generalized belief that the voter forms about his relationship to 
party, one that can survive deviating choices in the ballot box." (p.31 ) . 
Their finding has stimulated various attempts to use 
surrogate measures of voters' predispositions, (Budge et al, 1976) 
and created a general ambivalance about the concept of party 
identification itself. (Crewe et al, 1977) . 
This confusion about the value of party identification 
cross-nationally seems to us an unsatisfactory state of affairs. Are 
conditions in other countries like the U.K. really so different that 
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a concept as fundamental as party identification is only relevant to 
the American electorate? We propose therefore to reexamine the 
conventional wisdom about party identification in Great Britain by 
looking at two questions: (1) are party identification and current
vote intention really indistinguishable in Great Britain, and (2) how 
can we account for Butler and Stokes' finding that party identification 
is less stable and tends to covary with the vote more in Great Britain 
than in the U.S • .  The first question concerns the property of 
independence, and the second, the property of stability. 
THE INDEPENDENCE OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND THE VOTE 
The property of independence holds that party identification 
and the vote should not be identical. If it were otherwise, party 
identification would be redundant. We could simply use a person's 
vote as a measure of his general partisan inclinations; his standing 
decision would be his most recent voting decision. The reason we 
expect party identification and the vote not to be equivalent is that 
a person's vote (v
t) at time t consists of his standing decision (pidt
) 
and short term forces (stf
t
) .  Short term forces include, as we shall 
see in a moment, local candidate evaluations, specific policy 
evaluations and national leadership evaluations. Short term forces 
can provide two sorts of information for voters. One is information 
which updates a person's standing decision -- i. e. information that 
affirms, or causes you to change your normal party affiliation, The 
other is information that causes you to deviate from but not change 
your normal party affiliation. The latter, in other words, is 
information about a particular candidate or policy which causes you to 
to make an exception to your standing decision at a particular point 
in time. 
Consider, for illustrative purposes, three types of short 
term forces: 
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(1) Local Candidate Evaluations. In both the British parliamentary 
and the American Congressional elections, voters must signify a preference 
for a particular candidate. While the party label provides the voter 
with some general expectations about the candidate, it is quite 
likely that the voter will acquire additional information about the 
candidate in the course of the campaign or during the incumbent's 
term in office. Thus, a voter might say to himself "Normally, I 
prefer the Republicans, but this candidate is so undesirable that I 
will vote for the Democratic candidate instead." To some extent, 
the discipline of the British parliamentary system ought to weaken the 
importance of the individual candidate characteristics as compared 
to the U. S. , but it is likely that some British politicians attain 
enough visibility in their constitutencies to have a significant 
effect. 
(2) National Party Leaders. Leadership of the parties in both 
Great Britain and the United States is usually contested by rival 
factions within the party: for example, the Bow group versus the 
Monday club in the Conservative party, the Tribunists versus the 
Revisionist Socialists in the Labour party, the radical right versus 
the moderates in the Republican party, and the Southern Dixiecrats 
versus the Northern Liberals in the Democratic party. Control of the 
party by one faction can alter the perceived likely behavior and 
goals of the party in important and undesirable ways. Thus, a voter 
might say, "Normally, I feel closer to the Republicans, but a 
particular group of national leaders controls the party or influences 
the behavior of the party in such a manner that I will vote for the 
Democrats in this election." 
(3) Specific Policies. The expectations that individuals form 
about normal party behavior are based in good part on observations of 
the policies pursued in office and advocated during the campaign. 
Hence, it is possible to perceive that a party's policies are normally 
better, but to prefer another party on one particular issue. Partisan 
defection then becomes for the voter a means towards the achievement 
of a particular policy result, or a way of sending a message to the 
party in order to get it to alter its behavior. Thus, a voter might 
say, "Normally, I prefer the Republicans, but they are acting against 
my interests in this matter, and I want them to know this." Examples 
of the latter in Great Britain might be defections.from Labour over 
immigration in the sixties, or defections from the Conservatives to 
the Liberals in the early seventies over confrontation politics. 
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To argue that party identification and the vote are equivalent, 
it is not necessary to show that the correlation between them is perfect. 
In fact, it is not. The rate of defection (i. e. voting for a party 
other than the one you identify with) has varied in Great Britain. 
In the 1964 and 1966 elections, approximately 4 percent of those 
sampled voted for a party other than the one they identified with 
while in 1974, the figure was 11 percent. One need only argue that 
the correlation between party identification and the vote is imperfect 
because of random error. The "equivalence" hypothesis is thus 
(1)
where 
V - PID = u t t 
Vt is an individual's vote at time t 
PIDt is an individual's party identification 
at time t 
u is a random disturbance term caused by 
measurement error or the idiosyncratic 
traits of certain voters. 
The "independence" hypothesis maintains that the difference 
between voting intention and party identification is caused by both 
systematic short term forces and random error. The "independence 
hypothesis" is thus 
(2) 
where 
V
t 
PIDt STFt 
+ u 
STF
t 
are short term forces such as candidate 
and policy evaluations. 
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If the "equivalence" hypothesis holds in Great Britain but 
not in the United States, then it is valid to say that party 
identification is redundant in Great Britain and is merely another 
measure of current vote intention. If the "independence" hypothesis 
holds, then party identification and current vote intention are not 
equivalent, but differ by the impact of short term forces that cause 
voters to deviate from their normal allegiences. 
This gives us a test of independence. By estimating the 
probability of defection as a function of short term forces, we can 
determine whether the divergence between party identification and the 
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vote is caused by systematic factors or by random error alone. Formally, 
the equation is 
(3)
where 
y Bl+ B2STFt + u 
Y is the probability of voting for a party 
other than the one the respondent 
normally identifies with or V
t 
- PID
t 
STF are short term forces in the form of t 
variables for local candidate evaluations 
(LCE), national party leadership 
evaluations (NPLE) and specific policy 
evaluations (SPE) 
The independence of party identification and the vote is 
determined by the hypothesis test of the coefficient B2. If B2 is 
not significantly different from zero, then the deviations of vote 
7 
from party identification are the result of random disturbances, or 
at least factors that we cannot identify. If B2 is significantly 
different from zero, then current vote intention varies from PID as 
the result of short term forces. 
To keep within the time period of the original Butler and 
Stokes findings, we have taken the 1958 Congressional election and the 
1964 parliamentary elections as the data bases. The independent 
variables for both Britain and the U.S. are from the open-ended codes, 
using only references to the personal qualities and competence in the 
national leadership and local candidate evaluation variables.1 
A variety of coding procedures for the independent variables 
were explored, and each was found to have its own peculiar advantages 
and disadvantages.
2 
However, the results were consistently similar 
across all procedures, and we present one here which is commonly used, 
plausible and representative. It consists of first creating positive 
and negative mention variables for each of the three categories and 
for both the party one identifies with and the other pary. This 
gives us 12 variables in all, or 4 for each category of non-generalized 
cue, The composite measure simply takes the net of the positive and 
negative mention variables to form evaluations in each of the three 
categories for both the party identified with and the other, and then 
takes the difference between them in each category. This gives us a 
variable for each category which tells us whether on balance -- between 
positive and negative mentions -- the voter prefers the party identified 
with or the other. The expected sign of these variables is negative 
since the composite value is the score of the party identified with minus 
that of the other party and therefore the probability of defecting 
should increase as the evaluation variable is less than zero and 
should decrease as it is greater than zero.3 
The results of the estimations appear in Tables I and II 
[INSERT TABLES I AND II HERE] 
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The equations were estimated with a maximum likelihood logit procedure 
for Democratic and Republican identifiers only with the American data 
and for the Conservatives and Labour only with the British data. In 
both the American and British cases, there appear to be statistically 
significant parameters with the correct signs which account for 
partisan defections. The major difference between the American and 
British equations seems to be that for the periods under consideration, 
the national leadership cue is statistically significant in Great 
Britain and not in the U. S. , but it would be risky to speculate on the 
meaning of this without replicating the procedures over several years. 
The more important observation is that partisan defections in both 
Great Britain and the U. S. can be explained by statistically significant 
behavorial parameters and are not simply the artifacts of measurement 
errors. Apparently, contradictory short term forces will cause 
partisan defections in both countries, and party identification will 
not be synonomous with the vote in either political system when these 
cues are salient. 
STABILITY AND PARTY IDENTIFICATION 
While we have seen that party identification and the vote are 
TABLE I 
Probability of Partisan Defections in 
US Congressional Elections 1958 
Local Candidate Evaluation 
National Leadership Evaluation 
Policies Evaluation 
Constant 
Chi-Square for Equation 
Coefficient 
-1. 08 
- . 06 
- . 42 
-1. 62 
97. 98 
T-Test 
7. 7 
. 59 
4. 56 
9 
Chi-Square 
59. 96
. 35 
20.86 
TABLE II 
Probability of Partisan Defections in 
British Parliamentary Elections 1964 
Local Candidate Evaluation 
National Leadership Evaluation 
Policies Evaluation 
Constant 
Chi-square for Equation 
Coefficient 
-2.28 
- . 86 
- . 67 
-3. 71 
35. 78 
T-Test 
2.09 
4.45 
3. 50 
10 
Chi-Square 
4. 39
19. 87 
12. 30 
independent in Great Britain, just as they are in the U. S. , we are 
still left with the disturbing Butler and Stokes finding that party 
identification is more stable in the U.S. than in Great Britain, and 
that party identification and the vote covary more closely in Great 
Britain than in the U.S • .  The first question, of course, is why 
should stability matter at all. 
The expectation that party identification should be stable 
derives from the concept itself. Party identification is supposed 
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to measure a person's standing commitment to a party. While an 
individual's vote will change under the influence of short term forces, 
party identification should remain fairly stable, if indeed it measures 
what it is supposed to measure. An individual's standing commitment 
is based on three main factors. First, there is the person's family 
background. The original Michigan idea was that political affiliations, 
along with other socialized values, were transmitted across generations 
within a family; you became a Labourite or a Conservative because, 
in essence, you were brought up that way. A second cause of long 
term partisan affiliations is an individual's socioeconomic status. 
Butler and Stokes describe how individuals who see themselves as 
middle or working class are more likely to identify with the party 
of that class. As long as the individual does not move up or down 
the occupational ladder, class pressures should exert a relatively 
constant effect over an individual's political beliefs. Finally, a 
third component of party identification is the memory or association 
of past policy outcomes with a particular party. Over the years, 
individuals observe many party policy decisions, and on this basis, 
form expectations about how the party normally behaves in office and 
how this normally affects their welfare. Even though this memory 
may be updated by recent events, an individual's normal expectations 
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would change fairly slowly since this memory consists of many observations 
built up over time. Thus, like the biases of family socialization and 
class background, the expectation of normal party performance should 
be relatively stable over time. 
If we believe that roughly similar components go into the 
formation of party identification in the U.S. and the U.K., why should 
there be important differences in the relative stability of party 
identification and the vote in the two countries? Perhaps, then, we 
should look more closely at the original Butler and Stokes finding to 
understand better the basis of their claims. 
As evidence, Butler and Stokes presented the following tables: 
[ TABLE III AND IV HERE] 
Partisan self-image was coded as stable for a three year panel if an 
individual identified with the same party for all three years and as 
variable if the individual identified with two different parties and 
was never an independent over the three years. Voting preference was 
coded as stable if the individual voted for the same party in each 
election and variable if he voted for two different parties over the 
period and never abstained. The statement that party identification 
is more stable in the U.S. than in Great Britain is based on the 
marginals of these tables which show that while ninety-two percent 
of the United States electorate identified with the same party every 
Partisan 
Self-Image 
TABLE III 
Stability of Partisan Self-Image and Voting 
Preference for Parliament 1963-1964-1966 
Voting Preference 
stable variable 
f-•• ::::: 7: 11: 1 
79 21 
83 
17 
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TABLE IV 
Stability of Partisan Self-Image and Voting 
Preference for Congress 1956-1958-1960 
Party Preference in Voting for Congress 
stable variable 
Par<faan Stahl� r 76 I 16 I Self-Image variable 2 6 92 8 
78 22 
14 
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year, the corresponding figure for Great Britain was eighty-three percent. 
The tables from which Butler and Stokes draw these conclusions 
rest on two crucial suppositions. The first was that if a voter 
declared himself or herself an independent in any of the three surveys, 
that person was excluded from the calculations. This had two consequences. 
First, since there is a larger population of independents 
in the U.S., this decision led to the omission of a substantial fraction 
of the sample. Although Butler and Stokes do not say how they constructed 
these tables, attempts to reproduce them indicate that they classified 
independent leaners as party identifiers and used therefore the most 
narrow definition of independent in their coding. Nevertheless, Table I 
seems to be based on twenty-five percent of the respondents in the U.S. 
panel and Table II on seventy-one percent of the British panel 
respondents. 
Secondly, it meant that if someone identified with the Democrats, 
in 1956 and 1958, but with the independents in 1960, that person was 
excluded from the table altogether. The effect of this we will argue 
is to underestimate the variability of party identification, especially 
since independents are such a large segment of the U.S. electorate. 
Our expectations in this regard are confirmed in Table V where the 
independents have been included in the analysis. 
{ TABLE V HERE] 
Apparently, when independents are added to the American Table, there 
is essentially no difference in the stability of party identification 
between the two countries over the three year period. 
il.6 
TABLE V 
Partisan Self-Image in U.S. and G.B. when U .. S. 
Independents are Treated as a Third Party 
stable variable 
G.B. 79. 7 20.3 n = 1181 
U.S. 78.l 21.9 n = 1197 
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Of course, an important corollary of the Butler and Stokes 
argument was that party identification in the U.S. exhibits more of 
a tendency to remain stable when vote preference is shifting than in 
Great Britain. Again, turning to Table I and II, Butler and Stokes 
show that the ratio of those with stable party identifications and 
variable votes to those with variable party identifications and stable 
votes was eight to one in the U.S. and only two to one in the U. K. 
Moreover, only six percent of those in the U.S. table have variable 
votes and variable party identification while the corresponding 
number in Great Britain is fourteen percent. 
How do these tables compare when the independents are altered? 
ITABLE VI HERE] 
Notice that the ratio of those with stable partisan identification and 
variable vote to those with variable identifications and stable votes 
when the independents are treated like the Liberals in Great Britain 
is about two to one in both countries. Clearly, the decision to 
exclude the independents in the American case underestimates the 
variability of party identification and overestimates the ratio of 
those with stable party identification and variable votes to those 
with variable party identification and stable votes. 
The second crucial feature of the Butler and Stokes analysis 
is that it included the Liberals in the British table. Here again, 
one might have a priori doubts about the value of comparing the party 
identifications of minor party voters with those of major party voters. 
There are good reasons to expect that the party identifications of the 
Partisan 
Self-Image 
TABLE VI 
Stability of Partisan Self-Image and Voting 
Preference for Congress 1956-1958-1960 
(IndcpcndcntG Included) 
Vote 
stable variable 
stable I 66.6 I 16.2 I 82. 8 
variable I 7.0 I 10.2 I 17.2 
73.6 26.4 n = 569 
18 
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Liberals will be less stable than those of the more established parties. 
Both the Liberal surge of the early sixties and the most recent revival 
in 1974 were followed by rapid declines in voter support. Institutional 
barriers to representation as well as widespread uncertainty about 
what the Liberals stand for can be expected to cause a more rapid 
conversion in and out of the Liberal ranks than in the cases of the 
Conservative and Labour parties. Thus, we would predict that including 
the Liberals in these tables underestimates the stability of partisianship 
in Great Britain relative to the U.S. 
Again, our expectations are confirmed. In Table V we see 
that excluding the Liberals as well as the independents yields comparable 
levels of partisan stability in the U.S. and the U.K. Similarly, 
excluding the Liberals from Table VII shows that the ratio of the stable 
party identification and variable vote to variable party identification 
and stable vote becomes three to one rather than the previous two to one. 
[ TABLE VII AND VIII HERE]
The conclusion seems to be therefore that the original Butler 
and Stokes finding was highly dependent on its assumptions about which 
party identifications should be compared. The decision to include the 
Liberals and to exclude the independents resulted in an underestimate 
of stability in the British case and an overestimate of stability in 
the American case. If instead one compares the major parties in both 
countries only, the results across the two countries are far more 
similar. Alternatively, if one wanted to argue that identifying with 
the Liberals in Great Britain and the independents in the U.S. were 
TABLE VII 
Partisan Self-Image in U. S. and G.B. with 
Liberals and Independents Excluded 
stable variable ::::I :::: J--:::-ul n a 965 n = 1008 
20 
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TABLE VIII 
Stability. of Partis an Self-Image and Voting 
Preference for Parliament 1963-1964-1966 
(Liberals Excluded) 
Vote 
Stable Variable 
stabl e �l I 1. 1· I 92.2 
va:dable 0 I 5.8 I 7.8 
87.l 12.9 
21 
n = 783 
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both reactions to the policies of the established parties, once again 
the results would be comparable across countries. 
Clearly, there are important trade-offs to consider when 
making cross-national comparisons. The point is simply that before 
discarding party identification as a useful measure in Great Britain, 
one should look closely at the evidence, and in particular the assumptions 
behind the evidence. Should we expect the party identifications of 
minor party voters to be as stable as those of the major voters? Is an 
identification with a middle of the road third party similar to an 
identification with independence in the U.S.? If we have reason to 
believe that the answers to either or both of these questions is yes, 
then it is possible that the widespread skepticism about the value of 
party identification in a British context is unfounded. 
CONCLUSION 
We have shown in this paper that party identification in 
Great Britain satisfies the criteria of independence and stability, 
and that on these grounds, it should be considered as valid a concept 
as in the United States. Further, we have shown that the level of 
partisan stability and independence will vary with political circumstances. 
Does this mean that party identification varies in its usefulness? 
That depends on what one means by useful. As party identification 
becomes more independent due to salient contradictory cues, it may be 
less useful to the voter as a guide to behavior, but no less useful to 
the political scientist as a standard by which to measure political 
change, On the other hand, periods in which contradictory cues are 
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less salient may be those in which the voter finds party identification 
more useful while the political scientist finds party identification 
harder to distinguish from actual behavior. We would suggest that this 
irony has been the source of much confusion about the value of party 
identification in Great Britain. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. For the U. S. data in 1958, the local candidate mentions come 
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from the congressional candidate master code while the national 
leadership and issue variable mentions come from the party 
master code. For the British data, all variables are constructed 
from the master party code. 
.2. A common objection to open ended coding is that the underlying 
psychological assumption is very naive: namely, that the more 
positive things an individual can recall about x, the higher 
his or her evaluation of x will be. One is thus tempted to 
try alternatives which do not differentiate between the number 
of mentions. Curiously, however uneasy one may feel about 
using codings which count they seem to work as well or better 
than the other alternatives by almost all statistical criteria. 
3. To take an example, we have positive and negative mentions of 
the local candidate of the party identified with and the party 
not identified with. The difference between positive and nega-
tive mentions is the net for the party identified with and the 
other party. 
(Positive Negative) Net Party Identified With 
(Positive - Negative) Net for other Party. 
The combined score is the difference between the two scores 
(Net Party Identified With - Net for Other) = Combined Score. 
1.
2.
3 • 
4.
5.
6.
7. 
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